Now residing in the "Unusual Case Names" file is this recent sentencing opinion from the Ninth Circuit.

If you enjoy double entendre, why not take the Case Name Challenge?

In Luck's Music Library, Inc. and Moviecraft, Inc. v. Alberto Gonzales, the D.C. Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling in favor of the U.S. Attorney General on the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A. The contested section of the URAA "establishes copyrights of foreign holders whose works, though protected under the law where initially published, fell into the public domain in the United States for a variety of reasons..." Essentially, this law revoked works from the public domain and granted them copyright protection.

At issue are scores of foreign sheet music and commercial archival footage distributed by U.S. companies that operated under the assumption that a work in the public domain, stays in the public domain. Not so, said Senior Circuit Judge Williams, who listed several historical instances where the government has extended copyright protection for works that would have otherwise been part of the public domain.

The Luck's Music opinion draws many parallels between petitioners' arguments and those unsuccessfully advanced in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision which held that Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in enlarging the duration of copyrights under the Copyright Term Extension Act. [See Eldred's complete docket information]

In a telling passage, the Luck's Music decision sheds light on the impetus behind Section 514 of the URAA. "The Senate argued in support of § 514 that its adoption helped secure better foreign protection for US intellectual property and was “a significant opportunity to reduce the impact of copyright piracy on our world trade position.”" This suggests that 514 can be viewed as a bargaining chip thrown to foreign nations when the US petitioned for international adoption and enforcement of American-standard intellectual property laws.

Read in tandem with Elrded, Luck's Music further illustrates how the public domain has been reduced by contemporary IP trends favoring ownership.

Creators who sample and businesses that distribute foreign works from the public domain would be wise to verify the copyright status of their "stock" material.

Daniel H. Bromberg of Jones Day argued the cause for appellants.

John S. Koppel of the U.S. Department of Justice argued the cause for appellees.

New York and Michigan wine connoisseurs will be ecstatic to hear about today's Supreme Court news. In Granholm v. Heald, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated two state laws that regulate the sale of wine from out-of-state wineries to in-state consumers. Both New York and Michigan's regulations were found to discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and that discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which allows a state to establish its own liquor control laws.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, who delivered the Majority opinion stated, "The details and mechanics of the two regulatory schemes differ, but the object and effect of the laws are the same: to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state wineries from doing so, or, at the least, to make direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint."

Docketed on December 7, 2004, Granholm v. Heald consolidated an appeal of decisions in the Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Second Circuits. The Court affirmed the Sixth's ruling in Heald v. Engler, and reversed the Second Circuit in Swedenberg v. Kelly, which held that New York's prohibition of the direct sale and shipment of wine from unlicensed wineries to New York consumers lies within the 21st Amendment and thus is exempted from the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.

One consumer-centric outcome is that wine drinkers in New York and Michigan can now order wine directly from any California winery! So go ahead, folks, order up a case of Rutherford Merlot and rent Sideways.

In a follow-up to the post on InternetMovies.com and the MPAA, the U.S. Supreme court has recently denied certiorari in Rossi v. MPAA, a DMCA case last heard by the Ninth Circuit in December 2004.

According to this Andrews' article, the attorney for plaintiff Michael Rossi petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, arguing that InternetMovies.com was/is an online magazine entitled to full First Amendment protections.

In an unusual move, "The MPAA waived its right to file an opposition brief." The article does not make clear whether this right was affirmatively or involuntarily waived, but it's doubtful that the filing deadline accidentally slipped by the MPAA's counsel.

Today, in American Library Association, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit blocked the FCC's "Braodcast Flag" rules. The controversial rules required digital television receivers (DTVs) to embed code into all transmitted programs that would prevent redistribution of the programs. This code is also known as a "flag."

When the Commission enacted the broadcast flag regulations in 2003, it did so under the ancillary jurisdiction of Title I of the Communications Act of 1934. Title I states that the FCC "may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied: 1) the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I covers the regulated subject, and 2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities."

The Court held that while Title I does authorize the FCC to regulate a DTV apparatus during transmission, it does not authorize regulation of an apparatus after transmission is complete. Thus, "there is no statutory foundation for the broadcast flag rules, and consequently the rules are ancillary to nothing."

End result: the FCC's Flag Order is reversed and vacated insofar as it requires demodulator products manufactured on or after July 1, 2005 to recognize and give effect to the broadcast flag.

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit published a trademark decision in Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions. Very briefly, a surf & clothing company plaintiff, sued Survivor the TV show for infringement. This appellate decision affirmed summary judgement to Survivor on the grounds that there's no likelihood of confusion between the two marks.

This case, argued in the rugged paradise of Hawaii, marks the second federal trademark action against the Survivor Productions. The first occurred late in 2004 when Survivor the rock band unsuccessfully sued the show for infringement.

Survivor Productions appears to be 2-for-2 in the Litigation Immunity Challenge.

Andrew M. White of White O'Connor Curry & Avanzado LLP, Counsel for Survivor

"Fade into nightmare," reads the litigation webpage of Peter Hall, an independent filmmaker who stars as the plaintiff in the Second Circuit's Hall v. Earthlink. It's an appropriate cinematic metaphor, as the pages of the Judge Pooler's decision evoke Kafkaesque images of a struggling artist thwarted by a cold, calculating technology organization.

The basic plot runs like this: After working five years to complete his first film, Delinquent, Peter Hall is making final preparations for its nationwide premiere. He signs up for and uses an Earthlink email account, "lot99@earthlink.net," as a main avenue of marketing communications for the project. By chance, Earthlink accidentally identifies lot99 as a spammer on the Net Abuse Report and terminates Hall's account. A week later, with the assistance of Wired News, Earthlink retracts its spammer allegations, but for some reason, Hall's Earthlink email account is not reactivated.

Though the lot99 account is terminated, it continues to receive queries about the film. Not only is the account inaccessible by Hall, but it does not return undelivered mail to people who try to contact lot99. The ISP testifies that, "at the time relevant to this action, it did not have the ability to bounce email back to senders after the termination of an account." The explanation seems dubious, even by 1997 standards.

As a result of this series of unfortunate events, Hall cannot read, respond to or identify requests for information about the premiere of Delinquent -- a big deal when trying to promote an independent film. Over an 11 month period, lot99 receives 591 emails, all of which are eventually forwarded to Hall in July 1998, almost a year after the premiere.

On July 31, 1998, Hall files this complaint alleging seven counts against Earthlink, most notably breach of contract and an Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("EPCA") violation for wrongful interception of email.

At trial in the Southern District of New York, Earthlink is found not liable on the EPCA claim due to an "ordinary course of business" exception. Basically, Hall cannot provide evidence that the ISP acted outside the ordinary course of business when it continued to receive mail sent to the lot99 address. Thus, no "interception" in violation the statute.

The remaining claims are dismissed on summary judgment, primarily because there is no special contractual relationship between the parties, and because the consequential damages to Delinquent's success are not compensable. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirms the District Court's decision. [Curtain]

Finding a positive moral in Hall v. Earthlink is difficult. There's no deus ex machina to save the day -- it was the email snafu from Hell. Perhaps this litigation will bestow some beneficial cult status on Delinquent. Netflix doesn't carry the title yet, but it is available here. Better yet, maybe this experience will inspire a good movie about a movie.

Hall's lawyers: Andrew Grosso and William M. Palmer.

Earthlink's lawyers: John Bradham, Duval & Stachenfeld LLP.

The Librarian of Congress successfully defended his webcaster royalty rates from attack on three separate fronts in Beethoven.com v. Librarian of Congress. Beethoven reads like an accounting audit report, as it deals with the financial calculus employed by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP), the group charged with setting webcasting rates and terms "that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller," as outlined in § 114(f)(2)(B) of the DMCA.

Beethoven's complexity is only increased by the multiplicity of petitioners lining up to take issue with the Librarian's decision, which was largely based on the CARP’s recommendations. The petitioners are:

1) Non-Participants. These are entities (including Beethoven.com) that did not formally participate in the CARP's proceedings, but seek to intervene or join the action to a) challenge the rates, and b) argue that the CARP process was flawed because it excluded small webcasters and those who could not afford arbitration fees, violating their rights to due process and freedom of expression.

2) Copyright Owners. Made up of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and other industry groups, the Owners contend that the Librarian set rates arbitrarily low by not adequately considering past agreements he had on the record. The "past agreements" refer to 115 record label deals between record labels and licensees, which were purportedly created to guide CARP’s recommendations to the Librarian.

3) Broadcasters. This final group consists of radio/internet simulcasters and internet webcasters that claim that the Librarian’s rates were arbitrary, and that rates should be lowered because they were not based on real market factors.

As sound battle strategy dictates, an entity under siege should try to limit the number of attack fronts. The Librarian of Congress did just that when he successfully moved to eliminate the Non-Participants. Judge Sentelle, who authored the unanimous decision, ruled that the Non-Participants do not have standing to join the litigation. Further, they are not entitled to intervene and raise new issues because their First Amendment and Due Process claims were not sufficiently plead to bring them "into the purview of this action." Once again, Civil Procedure was skillfully used to disarm a potentially persuasive opponent.

With the Non-Participants out of the action, the remainder of the opinion focused on the related yet opposite claims of the Owners and Broadcasters. "Understandably, the Owners challenge the Librarian’s ruling as setting rates too low, and the Broadcasters argue that the rates have been set too high."

The Owners' primary contention is that the CARP, in setting benchmark valuations for licenses, disregarded a substantial portion of evidence when it chose to ignore 115 label agreements without sufficient explanation. Presumably, these label agreements contained terms highly favorable to the RIAA constituents.

The CARP explained that the label agreements were not relied upon in their royalty benchmark analysis because they did not involve the same digital performance rights at issue in the proceeding. Instead, the CARP gave considerable benchmark weight to an actual marketplace agreement between the RIAA and Yahoo! Under the "exceptionally deferential" standard of review, the Court did not find the Librarian's or the CARP's treatment of the 115 label agreements arbitrary.

On the opposite side of the coin, the Broadcasters claim that the CARP acted arbitrarily when it ignored the Broadcasters' proposed benchmark for determining the fair market value of the performance right. This proposal, which was based on a computation of the performance fees paid by over 800 radio stations for rights to musical works, was ultimately rejected in favor of the amounts used in the RIAA-Yahoo! agreement.

According to the Broadcasters, the RIAA-Yahoo! agreement is a disingenuous agreement, "negotiated in a nascent market controlled by an allegedly monopolistic group that employed market power to set fees it knew would be used as CARP evidence." Reiterating the low standard of appelate review of an administrative decision, the Court rejected the Broadcasters' argument because it rests on a challenge to the merits of the Librarian’s decision to rely on the RIAA-Yahoo! agreement as competitive. The Court's only role in this action is to determine only whether the Librarian explained his decision on comparability in "facially plausible" terms according to record evidence.

Other objections to the benchmarks, the minimum fee, and the effective dates of the rates, met with similar fate under the D.C. Circuit's arbitrary standard analysis. At the end of the day, the Librarian's chosen royalty rates remain fully intact.

The details of the CARP’s pricing decisions are published in the "CARP Report." The Librarian, however, did not follow every CARP royalty reccommendation. He abandonned the CARP's dual-rate structure used to distinguish between radio retransmission and internet-only webcasting, in favor of an average of the two rates, .07 cents per performance. The Librarian accepted the CARP's suggested minimum fee of $500 (the RIAA wanted a minimum fee of $5,000).

Bruce G. Joseph argued the cause for Participant Licensee petitioners. Michele J. Woods argued the cause for Copyright Owners/Performers petitioners. Mark W. Pennak, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent.

In the Ninth Circuit's Knievel v. ESPN, motorcycle stunt legend Evel Knievel and his wife Krystal sued the sports network for defamation. The Knievels alleged they were defamed when EXPN.com posted a picture of Krystal, Evel and another woman, bearing the caption, "Evel Knievel proves that you're never too old to be a pimp."

The trio was photographed in the Green Carpet Gallery of ESPN's radical Action Sports and Music Awards ceremony, "at which celebrities in the fields of extreme sports and popular music such as rap and heavy metal converged." In the picture at issue, Knievel "has one arm around each woman and he wears rose-tinted sunglasses and a motorcycle jacket."

In defamation cases, the context of the stinging remark is very important, and the Court's majority analysis focused heavily upon this factor. As it turns out, the offending photo appeared in a series of 17 Green Carpet Gallery photos. In order to see Knievel's mack pose, web users had to first click through ten other celeb photos with silly fabricated captions, such as a pic of two men grasping hands, with a caption that reads "Colin McKay and Cary Hart share the love," or a woman in a black dress, with the caption "Tara Dakides lookin' sexy, even though we all know she is hardcore."

As the Court concluded, "Read in the context of the satirical, risque, and sophomoric slang found on the rest of the site, the word "pimp" cannot be reasonably interpreted as a criminal accusation." Dismissal of the action was affirmed, and the Knievels will not get their day in court.

Unfortunately, the Knievels suffered real damages as a result of the publicity stunt, such as a bruised reputation and having to endure "hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy that caused them to be shunned and avoided." Also, several of Evel's former clients do not want him associated with their product.

This is a shame because Evel Knievel has given a lot to the public over the years. Evel has performed amazing death-defying feats, like jumping over 14 Greyhound buses, so I remain confident that he can and will overcome this setback.

Finally, as evident in this case (and as I've discussed in previous posts), younger generations have romanticized and enshrined the art of pimping. Unfortunately, most elders do not appreciate modern art.

Die hard fans of The Sopranos will surely enjoy Baer v. Chase, a dispute in the Third Circuit between David Chase, creator of the hit series, and Robert Baer, an attorney who purportedly contributed ideas to Chase during the show's initial development.

The trail of events leading up to the lawsuit is well-worn: A producer meets with a person who has knowledge of a certain area; Ideas are exchanged; Follow up calls, meetings and letters transpire; An oblique verbal assurance of compensation is uttered; Nothing is put in writing; The show is produced and becomes a huge success; The contributor now wants to get paid.

Unlike many half-baked "He stole my idea" claims, however, this case contains concrete evidence of plaintiff's contribution. For example, Baer put Chase in touch with several good fellas who "told true and sometimes personal stories involving loan sharking, a power struggle with two uncles involving a family business, and two individuals, Big Pussy and Little Pussy." These facts (which exist in the public record) bear a striking resemblance to Sopranos characters Uncle Junior and Pussy Bonpensiero. Seriously, what writer could've thought up a mobster named "Pussy"?

Central to Baer's breach of contract claims is proving the existence of an actual compensation agreement. Siding with the defense, the Court found there was neither an express oral contract, nor an implied-in-fact contract stemming from Baer's interaction with Chase. Crucial terms, such as price and length of relationship, were simply too vague to support contract formation. Plaitiff's misappropriation claim was also denied, as none of the ideas presented to Chase were "novel" as the law requires.

Though most of Baer's appeal took a beating, he does have one last chance to recover. The Third Circuit preserved his equitable claim of quantum meruit, which asserts that a quasi-contract was formed when Baer rendered services of value to Chase's project. On remand to the U.S. District Court of New Jersey (presided by the Honorable Judge Pisano!), plaintiff may be able to recover some consideration for his script critique and idea contributions, if certain procedural requirements are met.

Oddly enough, the dispute between Baer and Chase seems to have provided fodder for a Second Season Sopranos episode entitled "D-Girl." In D episode, Christopher Moltisanti (Michael Imperioli), a young wiseguy/aspiring screenwriter, befriends a film producer and his female script assistant. Eager to impress the Hollywood pair, Christopher takes them on an insider's tour of Jersey and shares first-hand stories of mafia activity. By the end of the hour, the unscrupulous producer has used Christopher's stories and ideas in his own work, without reciprocation. An angry Christopher has just learned his first lesson in Hollywood ethics. Sound familiar?

Baer v. Chase is not the first legal incident to spring from the award winning show. The Sopranos has no shortage of lawsuits or lawyers. In March of 2003, James Gandolfini (Tony Soprano) filed a complaint against HBO seeking to break his existing contract with the show. That suit was ultimately withdrawn by Gandolfini's attorney Martin Singer when HBO agreed to renegotiate the Boss' salary. As for lawyers connected to the show, Lloyd Braun, a former entertainment law practitioner, is reported to have "developed the concept for HBO's Emmy Award-winning drama." Incidentally, Braun was recently hired by Yahoo! to head its media and entertainment division.

Lawyers are not traditionally thought of as innovators of creative entertainment. This case suggests otherwise. It also suggests that lawyers entering the exciting world of showbiz should keep their legal wits about them. And never forget the golden rule: Get Everything In Writing.

Big Easy rap artists Juvenile and D.J. Jubilee did battle in the Fifth Circuit's Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., over two songs that both "include the poetic four-word phrase 'back that ass up.'"

According to PBT's copyright infringement complaint, Juvenile recorded "Back That Azz Up" (released on 400 DEGREEZ album) after hearing Jubilee's "Back That Ass Up" (from the TAKE IT TO THE ST. THOMAS album). D.J. Jubilee's song enjoyed modest success, while Juvenile's song "blew up," as they say in the business.

The Fifth affirmed the appealed rulings of the lower court, including, most notably, the judgment in favor of Juvenile on the copyright claim. The Court held that although Jubilee was the registered copyright holder of his own song "Back That Ass Up," the jury correctly found that: 1) Jubilee failed to proved that Juvenile factually copied "Back That Ass Up"; 2) the defendants proved that Juvenile independently created "Back That Azz Up"; and 3) Jubilee failed to prove that "Back That Azz Up" is substantially similar to "Back That Ass Up."

Aside from dealing in bass subject matter of the streets, this opinion contains a treble discussion of the intricacies of copyright infringement actions, including curing procedural defects in jurisdictional matters and providing adequate proof of factual copying.

"A must-read for entertainment industry counsel shopping for the right forum." -- David Manning, Ridgefield Press

In Bassiouni v. Central Intelligence Agency, the venerable Judges Easterbrook, Posner and Sykes of the Seventh Circuit deftly smothered a law professor's appeal that arose out of his request for documents from the CIA.

Some Background: In 1983, Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, head of DePaul Law School's International Human Rights Law Institute and a frequent participant in human-rights activities, asked the CIA for copies of all documents that mention him. The Agency said that it had documents, but wouldn't provide any additional information (dubbed a "no number, no list response"). In 1999, the prof again tried to get information out of the CIA, but received another "no number, no list response." Bassiouni then brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act to compel the Agency's disclosure.

The Seventh held that although the professor's request is harmless, the CIA is not required to make further disclosure. Revealing details of its holdings could seriously compromise the intelligence gathering process as well as risk the safety of Agency operatives. Judge Easterbrook likened the CIA's record repository to a Roach Motel: "papers go in but they don't come out."

When faced with a request for information, there are two stances the government may take when it wants to be unhelpful: the "Glomar response" (a refusal to acknowledge that it has responsive documents) and the "no number, no list response". This opinion establishes a new term of art, the "Bassiouni response," which now encapsulates both unhelpful positions, "which are legally identical."

In Michael Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America, the Ninth Circuit disposed of a movie website's appeal against the MPAA. The underlying suit brought by Rossi (dba InternetMovies.com) claimed 1) tortious interference with contractual relations, 2) libel, 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other harms relating to the MPAA's temporary shutdown of the internetmovies.com website, which was effectuated by a cease and desist letter to Rossi's ISP.

The Ninth affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the MPAA was not liable to Rossi on the tortious interference claim because its actions complied with the "notice and takedown" provisions of the DMCA (17 U.S.C. § 512). As to the defamation and emotional distress claims, the Court found them unconvincing because the notice to the ISP was a privileged communication under the DMCA and was sent "within the bounds of decency."

Perhaps the most interesting portion of this case is the discussion of the DMCA's "good faith belief" requirement, which states that a party must have a good faith belief that infringing activities are occurring on a suspected site before it can send a takedown notice to the site's ISP. Rossi argued that the MPAA did not have an objective good faith belief before sending the notice because they did not do an investigation into the activities of internetmovies.com. Had the MPAA conducted such an investigation (by clicking on links advertising free movie downloads), it would have found that no infringement was actually occurring at internetmovies.com.

Instead, the Court sided with the MPAA, holding that there must only be a subjective good faith belief that infringing activity is occurring. Judge Rawlinson's arrival at this conclusion is supported by case law, Congressional intent and overall statutory structure of the DMCA.

The Court's subjective interpretation of good faith belief may be construed as giving copyright owners a license to shoot first ask questions later. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a reasonable decision in light of the facts of this case. Internetmovies.com revealed the following contents: "Join to download full length movies online now! new movies every month"; "Full Length Downloadable Movies"; and "NOW DOWNLOADABLE." These statements were followed by graphics for a number of the MPAA's copyrighted motion pictures.

Regardless of one's view on the issue, this particular DMCA decision helps define the narrow boundaries of tort exposure under the DMCA. Since the statute's inception, the DMCA has proven to be a heavy-handed and sometimes effective approach to copyright infringement on the internet, and it has created a big grey area as to acceptable and unacceptable online behavior. After reading this case, I feel compelled to pass on the guidance uttered by counsel for a prominent electronic consumer rights organization: "Just don't get caught."

In Creative Computing v. GetLoaded.Com, the Ninth Circuit heard arguments from two online "load-matching" service companies. The suit brought by Creative Computing (dba, Truckstop.com) alleged trade dress and copyright infringement claims as well as violations of the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) by the defendant, a rival load-matching company whose products looked suspiciously like plaintiffs.

While the opinion primarily deals with damage calculations under the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, it does include an interesting hacker story in the "Facts" section.

Here's a preview: "The Getloaded officers thought trucking companies would probably use the same login names and passwords on truckstop.com as they did on getloaded.com. Getloaded’s president, Patrick Hull, used the login name and password of a Getloaded subscriber, in effect impersonating the trucking company, to sneak into truckstop.com. . . Getloaded’s officers also hacked into the code Creative used to operate its website. Microsoft had distributed a patch to prevent a hack it had discovered, but Creative Computing had not yet installed the patch on truckstop.com. . ."

Aside from the obvious ethical lesson here, this case underscores the importance of downloading and installing the latest Windows security updates. In the plaintiff's defense, much of this commercial snooping took place in 1999, before Windows security flaws started making headline news.

In Hughes v. Hughes, film makers Albert and Allen Hughes were sued by their father, Albert Sr., for stating that their "dad's a pimp." The comment was made during an interview, conducted by the elegant Veronica Webb, that was later published in Vanity Fair.

Father Hughes' defamation claim was based on the fact that, although he WAS formerly a pimp from 1978-1981, he no longer "dabbled in the pimptorial arts." Thus, the defense of truth should not be available to the twin brothers. Instead, the pleadings alleged that the remark was a "nasty, tasteless lie" made by the Hughes brothers to promote their then-new movie American Pimp.

The Second California Appellate district in L.A. disagreed with the mack daddy, and affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the film makers, reasoning: "The communication “[o]ur dad’s a pimp” could reasonably be understood as meaning that he had at one time engaged in that activity. And a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the “gist or sting” of the remark does not necessarily depend on when the plaintiff was a pimp."

Post Script: For those of us laboring in clinical regions of the legal profession, pimpin' possesses a certain renegade charm. The Hughes case magnifies this allure by combining pimps with celebrities. Like a tell-all talk show, it irresistibly descends into celebrity dirt in its talk of sordid deposition excerpts and lengthy discussion of Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.